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Perspectives on the Deferral
Of U. S. Taxation of the
Earnings of Foreign Corporations
By JOSEPH ISENBERGH

The University of Chicago School of Law

Introduction
A central element of the U. S. tax regime
imposed on the foreign earnings of U. S. persons
-and during much of the history of U. S. taxation the one with the greatest power to move the
imagination of tax lawyers-is the possibility of
deferring U. S. taxation of the income of foreign
corporations. This possibility results from the
separate legal identity of corporations in the
U. S. tax system, which regards a corporation as
a taxpayer separate from its shareholders. A
foreign corporation, even when owned by Americans, is a separate person that sometimes operates beyond the reach of the U. S. taxing power.
When foreign corporations owned by U. S.
persons are not subject to current U. S. taxation,
the tax regime they enjoy is known as "deferral,"
because the earnings of foreign corporations
owned by Americans are not exposed to U. S.
income tax until they are actually returned to
U. S. shareholders as dividends or other gains
constituting currently taxable income. U. S. tax
is accordingly deferred on foreign earnings that
remain undistributed.
The deferral of U. S. taxation, given the time
value of money, offers an obvious reward, with
the -constraint that deferral is worthwhile only
when the sum of foreign income taxes imposed
on a corporation is significantly lower than the
U. S. rate that would be imposed absent deferral.
@© 1988, Joseph Isenbergh
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Recent decreases in the marginal rates of U. S.
taxation have doubtless blunted the value of
deferral in a range of situations. It remains true,
though, when foreign taxes are either very small
or zero, that protracted or indefinite deferral
approaches the value of total exemption from
U. S. tax. And there are still economic environments outside the United States where taxation
is benign. The final benefit of deferral arises
when shares of foreign corporations that have
escaped U. S. taxation receive a fair market
value basis upon the death of their individual
owners. From one generation to the next, deferral
becomes exemption.
Virtually the entire system of U. S. taxation
of overseas operations can be understood as an
elaborate corollary of (and reaction to) the basic
premise that foreign corporations are separate
taxpayers. As it stands today, U. S. taxation of
foreign income is a complex, even Byzantine,
mix of deferral and current taxation bound together in a complex of statutory rules. In
broadest overview, deferral remains possible for
active business operations undertaken through
foreign corporations. It is not available, however,
for a variety of "tax haven" operations, conducted through so-called controlled foreign corporations, i. e., corporations under the actual
control or ownership of a small number of U. S.
shareholders. The passive investment income and
tax haven earnings of controlled foreign corporations are immediately taxable to their U. S.
shareholders. In addition, some operations of
noncontrolled foreign corporations fall within
the reach of current U. S. taxation under several
recent statutory changes. The incomes of most
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foreign passive investment companies are now
exposed to immediate U. S. taxation, and the
movement of assets in and out of noncontrolled
foreign' corporations is now subject to a number
of special rules triggering the current recognition
of gain and loss by U. S. shareholders.
This pattern of taxation has evolved by accretion over the past 50 years, and as in many
other segments of the U. S. tax system, it is not
easy to find either larger implications or a unifying design. Compulsively, I will attempt to do
so anyway. The following pages present the current system of deferral in overview, with particular emphasis on the more recently enacted
provisions, along with a few observations on
matters of policy.
Recent Provisions. The sphere of deferral
has been notably eroded by several recent additions to the Code. These include in particular
the new rules of Sections 367(d) and 482 governing transfers of intellectual property to foreign corporations, the enlargement of the scope
of current taxation of controlled foreign corporations under Subpart F, and perhaps most importantly the introduction of a new income tax
regime for passive foreign investment companies
in which U. S. persons own shares. Also bearing
significantly on the value of deferral is the repeal
of the tax preference for capital gains in the
1986 Tax Reform Act. The cumulative force of
these provisions may not be fully appreciated
even by many tax lawyers.
Academic Versus Lawyerly Perspectives.
Before venturing further into the labyrinth of
present law, I should reveal my own basic attitude on deferral, as well as certain assumptions
that I hold about my audience's. My impression
in general is that tax lawyers rather like deferral.
It brings measurable tax benefits to clients with
overseas operations and enshrouds those benefits
in an almost overwhelmingly complex web of
rules that it falls to the lawyer to untangle. In
this regard I would imagine that partners almost
surely think more highly of deferral than do
associates.
On the other end of the spectrum, most tax
academics think rather ill of deferral. Where it
prevails, deferral tends to misallocate capital. It
is a tenet of international finance that capital
should be induced to flow where real (i. e., pretax) returns are the highest. A regime of current
worldwide taxation serves this end better than
deferral, which may induce investment in low-tax
environments for real returns that are lower
than those available elsewhere. In its present
gerrymandered form, deferral has the additional
vice of inducing the creation of costly and cumbersome structures for foreign investment, groaning
under the weight of transactional complexities
created for the sole purpose of capturing the
remaining possibilities of deferral.
There is, I should add, an intellectually coherent defense of deferral on a "second best"
theory, to wit that deferral serves to offset other
December, 1988

burdens imposed by the U. S. income tax system
on foreign investment, such as the denial of
investment credits and accelerated cost recovery
for capital assets used outside the United States.
That defense was more plausible, however, before
the 1986 Act, which eliminated most of the special
investment incentives even in the domestic economic environment.

Deferral over the Years
With biases fully disclosed, let us take a
quick survey of how we got where we are.
The possibility of deferral of U. S. taxation
was nearly absolute in the early years of the
U. S. income tax. The tax sheltering possibilities
for benignly taxed foreign operations were correspondingly nearly unlimited.
Foreign Personal Holding Companies. The
first and simplest adaptation devised by taxpayers to the possibility of deferral was the so-called
foreign personal holding company. An individual
would transfer income-producing assets (or assets
ripe with unrealized gains) to a wholly owned
corporation chartered in a low-tax foreign jurisdiction. Assets held or sold in such entities might
attract no current income tax whatsoever. Even
if the assets were actually invested in the United
States, the resulting dividends would be taxed
at the relatively low flat rate withholding taxes
imposed on foreign taxpayers.
The response of the U. S. tax system to
these possibilities was a set of statutory provisions (adopted in 1937 and now codified in Code
Sections 551 through 558) limiting deferral for
"foreign personal holding companies." These
rules aim rather narrowly at what have been
called "incorporated pocketbooks"-foreign. investment entities owned and controlled by a small
number of U. S. individuals. The income of a
foreign personal holding company is taxed directly
to their U. S. shareholders, which eliminates the
tax advantage of using a foreign corporation.
The foreign personal holding company rules
reach only a narrowly defined class of corporation with a specific type of income. A "foreign
personal holding company" is a foreign corporation (1) in which more than 50 percent of the
total combined power of all classes of stock or
the total value of the stock is owned directly
or indirectly, at any time during the taxable year,
by five or fewer U. S. individuals and (2) which
derives at least 60 percent of its gross income
in the form of "foreign personal holding company
income." The latter is a mix of various types of
passive investment income and tax shelter income.
Foreign "Base Companies." For 25 years
after their enactment, the foreign personal holding company rules stood as the only statutory
encroachment on the regime of tax deferral.
When it bites, the tax on foreign personal holding companies is quite fearsome, but its range
is narrow. It does not reach corporations owned
and controlled by more than five individuals, or
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corporations (even closely held) with a preponderance of active business income. Widely owned
enterprises, and in particular foreign subsidiaries
of publicly owned U. S. corporations, are left
entirely unscathed.
It is hardly surprising that operations conducted through foreign corporations flourished
beyond the reach of the foreign personal holding
company rules.. A number of tax-motivated
structures became widespread. A common theme
of these ventures was the shift of income from
high-tax to low-tax environments without incurring real economic risks in the latter.
A foreign corporation organized to operate
as a center of accounting profit severed from its
economic moorings is known as a "base company."
A U. S. enterprise 'selling goods overseas, for
example; might sell them in bulk at a low price
to a foreign subsidiary in a tax haven country
(the base company), which would in turn sell
them at a high price to a second subsidiary (possibly a lower tier subsidiary of the same enterprise) engaged in selling the goods in their market
of destination. The resale by the base company
would be set at the highest possible price, resulting in a large profit in a tax-favored environment,
while the foreign corporation engaged in final
distribution in a high-tax jurisdiction would have
a correspondingly high cost basis in the goods
and would be unlikely to make a taxable profit.
The pattern overall is a deflection of income
from the place of manufacture and distribution
to a tax haven entity serving as a conduit. The
permutations and combinations of uses of base
companies are nearly endless.
The 1962 Legislation: Subpart F. The first
large-scale break in the armor of deferral came
with the adoption of Subpart F in the Revenue
Act of 1962. In 1961 the Kennedy Administration
proposed doing away with deferral for all foreign
corporations controlled by U. S. persons. The
broad ground for this position was the bias
induced by deferral in favor of overseas investment against domestic investment. In the Administration's view, current U. S. taxation of
controlled foreign corporations across the board
would restore a measure of neutrality to investment decisions across national boundaries, and
was accordingly more efficient. The Administration also expressed a more specific concern
about abuses of offshore tax havens. The bill
sent to Congress by the Administration in 1961
imposed current taxation on the U. S. shareholders of essentially all controlled foreign corporat'ons. The U. S. business community responded
that overseas operations were on the whole legitimate business undertakings rather than tax haven
maneuvers, and that the competitive posture of
U. S. enterprises in overseas markets would be
devastated if they were taxed more heavily than
their competitors from other countries.
Whatever its merit-and in truth it has rather
little-this response met with sympathy in Congress, and has also framed the public debate over
1064

deferral ever since. The House of Representatives adopted a scaled-down version of the Administration's bill that imposed current taxation
on various types of tax haven operations, on
income attributable to intangible property used
overseas, and on foreign profits used to create
new overseas ventures. In the Senate, the reach
of the legislation was cut back even further,
current taxation being limited to passive income
and tax haven income (in the form of various
types of base company income), while deferral
was continued for income from active business
operations. The legislation finally adopted in
1962 as Subpart F essentially contained the
Senate's version of the bill.
The 1962 version of Subpart F embodied
the view that the decision by a U. S. firm to
engage in business in a low-tax environment is
itself acceptable (and not in itself a "tax haven"
operation), but that the receipt of passive income
offshore and the deflection of income to low-tax
jurisdictions away from the country of actual
economic activity are abuses. Subpart F as
originally adopted (and still today) attempts in
effect to distinguish between "legitimate" overseas undertakings and "bad" tax haven operations.
The 1962 Act also introduced Section 1248,
which largely curtailed the possibility of capturing gains from liquidations or sales of controlled
foreign corporations as capital gains. Together,
Subpart F and Section 1248 established a separate tax regime for controlled foreign corporations, to a great extent still in place.

Recent Enlargements of the
Reach of Subpart F
While the major elements of the 1962 enactment survive today as the baseline tax regime
for controlled foreign corporations, the provisions of Subpart F have been tightened several
times since 1962, and major changes were introduced in the 1986 Act. In the present version,
current U. S. taxation reaches far more overseas
economic activity of controlled foreign corporations than did the 1962 Act, while the repeal
of the capital gains preference in the 1986 Act
reduced Section 1248 to a bystander role.
Expanded Notion of "Control" Under Subpart iF. Subpart F imposes current taxation on
the U. S. shareholders of "controlled" foreign
corporations only, making control a major threshold
of taxation under Subpart F. A controlled foreign corporation under the 1962 Act was one in
which U. S. shareholders held over half the
voting power. The 1986 Act enlarged the class
of "controlled" foreign corporations under Subpart F to include those in which U. S. shareholders own more than half of the value, even
without voting control.' Either beneficial owner1 A controlled foreign corporation is defined in Section 957(a) as "any foreign corporation if more than 50
percent of (1) the total voting power of all classes of
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ship or voting control by U. S. persons now
exposes a foreign corporation to current U. S.
taxation under Subpart F. It is no longer possible to avoid current U. S. taxation of foreign
corporations by shifting voting power to a group
of foreign investors who are not major equity
holders. The wonderfully accommodating foreign banks of yesteryear that would hold issues
of voting preferred stock and occasionally send
someone to a director's meeting, while consistently manifesting a healthy indifference to the
day-to-day management of the corporation, have
largely disappeared from the scene. It is important to note, though, that current taxation
under Subpart F is still imposed only on U. S.
persons who have a measure of voting power in
controlled foreign corporations.' A correlation
between some implicit power to force a realization of gains (i. e., control) and current U. S.
taxation is thus still an element of Subpart F.
Expanded Range of Subpart F Income.
While Subpart F still rests overall on a basic
distinction between active business operations
(for which deferral is allowed) and tax haven
operations (which 'are taxed currently to U. S.
shareholders), several types of foreign income
have moved across the boundary under recent
provisions, and the distinction is now less crisp
than in 1962. When Subpart F was first adopted,
foreign base company income (the central category of Subpart F income) included only passive
investment income and income from tax haven
arrangements between related taxpayers. No income from active business transactions with
unrelated persons (even though conducted in
low tax jurisdictions) was subject to current
U. S. taxation. Enlargements of base company
income in 1975, 1982, and most importantly 1986,
brought foreign shipping income, foreign oil related income, and a far broader range of financial
income within the class.
The most important of these changes is the
enlarged inclusion of passive-type income within
Subpart F in the 1986 Act, principally through
the addition of financing income earned by banks
and insurance companies to the class of foreign
personal holding company income, even when
it is derived from active business operations.
This is a significant departure from the principle
that Subpart F aims strictly at tax haven structures, though it remains the case that the operations reached by Subpart F have the common trait of being relatively easy to steer into
a low tax environment, even when an active business
is involved. A better encapsulation of Subpart F
in its present sway would be that it reaches
foreign operations in which relatively liquid or
relatively mobile capital is a dominant factor.

for the earnings deficits of controlled foreign
corporations. Before the 1986 changes, accumulated deficits in earnings and profits of controlled foreign corporations from prior years
reduced the earnings and profits of the current
year. This resulted, roughly, in a system of
loss carryforwards under Subpart F.
The 1986 Act brought significant limitations
to the effect of prior deficits on the includible
income of U. S. shareholders of controlled foreign corporations. Deficits are now taken into
account only within specific lines of activity that
generate earnings themselves subject to current
taxation. Under Section 9 52(c) (1) (B) (i), the
amount of Subpart F income includible by a
U. S. shareholder for any taxable year. and
attributable to a "qualified activity" is reduced
by the shareholder's "pro rata share of any qualified deficit." The key terms of art here, of course,
are the "qualified activity" and the "qualified
deficit." A "qualified deficit" is a deficit in earnings from a prior taxable year of a controlled
foreign corporation (but later than 1986) "attributable to the same qualified activity as the
activity giving rise to the income being offset." 3
Prior years' deficits in earnings can offset only
income from. qualified activities and must originate with these activities. Thus base company
sales or services income cannot be reduced by
prior deficits, nor can the investment income of
nonfinancial institutions.
The new rules on deficits curtail sharply the
potential tax benefit from the acquisition of loss
corporations by controlled foreign corporations,
a practice widely followed before the 1986 Act
with gratifying results. The changed treatment
of earnings deficits of foreign corporations after
1986 roughly mirrors the constraints imposed on
transfers of loss corporations generally in Section 382. The new rules are not invariably less
favorable than pre-1986 law, however. A "qualified deficit" from a prior year will now reduce
Subpart F income from the same activity. Before, a prior deficit would reduce all earnings and
might therefore have no effect on Subpart F
income if there were enough other income. On
balance, though, the new regime is far more
severe.

New Treatment of Deficits of
Controlled Foreign Corporations

3 The four "qualified activities" are those giving rise
to (1) foreign base company shipping income, (2)
foreign base company oil related income, (3) insurance
income (but only for an insurance company), and (4)
foreign personal holding income (in the hands of a
financial institution).

A less visible, but equally important way
in which the 1986 Act reduced the scope of
deferral was the introduction of a new regime
December, 1988

stock . . . entitled to vote, or (2) the total value of the
stock, is owned.. . by United States shareholders on any
day during the taxable year of such foreign corporation."
Because more than 50 percent ownership or control is
required, an exactly equal partnership between foreign
persons and Americans escapes Subpart F.
2A
United States shareholder is defined in Section
951(b) as "a United States person . . . who owns ... 10

percent or more of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote of such foreign corporation." Only United States shareholders within this
definition are subject to current taxation under Subpart F.
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The 1986 Act also repealed Section 952(d)
(known as the chain deficit rule), under which
the earnings and profits of corporations in a
chain of corporations were reduced by deficits
in earnings and profits of other members of the
chain. The effect of the rule was that all the
deficits in earnings of the members of a chain
were aggregated and could reduce Subpart F
income.
Overall, the chain deficit rule was similar
in its effect to direct ownership of the underlying
assets of the foreign corporations by their U. S.
shareholders. Its repeal makes losses arising in
separate foreign entities far more costly, and is
in this respect fully consistent with the increased
severity toward losses manifested by the 1986
Act generally.

The Repeal of the Capital
Gains Preference
Capital Gains in the New World. Section
1248, long a centerpiece of the tax regime imposed on controlled foreign corporations, faded
into the background after the repeal in the 1986
Act of preferred rates of tax for capital gains.
The capital gains preference explained both the
existence and the mechanics of Section 1248.
Before the adoption of Subpart F in 1962,
the sale by a U. S. person of shares of a foreign
corporation, like the sale of any other shares,
produced capital gains. If the earnings of the
foreign corporation had been untaxed or lightly
taxed outside the United States, the U. S. capital
gains tax (at the time much lower than the U. S.
tax on ordinary income) would ultimately be the
only tax imposed on the foreign earnings, even
after their effective "repatriation" through the sale
of shares. The resulting tax regime for foreign
earnings was notably less onerous than the domestic regime. A deferred tax at capital gains
rates might be the only tax cost of foreign operations. Subpart F brought current U. S. taxation to certain foreign earnings and some indirect
repatriations.
Within its four corners, Subpart F left open
the possibility of capital gains from the liquidation or sale of foreign corporations, because it
did not reach the non-tax-haven operations of
controlled foreign corporations or sales of shares
of controlled foreign corporations. Section 1248
filled the gap left open by Subpart F in the 1962
Act, by taxing gains from the liquidation or sale
of shares of a controlled foreign corporation as dividends, to the extent the gains are attributable to
earnings on which U. S. taxation has been deferred. In effect, Section 1248 prevents the repatriation of foreign earnings at capital gains
rates.
A minor paradox is that Section 1248, originally conceived to cut down the potential benefit
of converting ordinary income to capital gain, now
tends to be favorable to taxpayers in the situa1066

tions where it applies. This is so because, for
corporate shareholders, the constructive dividend
that results from a sale of shares under Section
1248 has, like any other dividend, the effect of
pulling out "deemed paid" foreign income taxes
that may produce foreign tax credits. The capital
gain that would result from the sale of the shares
absent Section 1248 would have no such effect.
Section 1248 is thus now essentially a measure of
tax relief, which softens the tax consequences of
sales by U. S. corporations of shares of foreign
subsidiaries. Without Section 1248(a), a U. S.
parent corporation would have to arrange an
explicit dividend distribution before any sale of
shares in order to preserve the credit, and even
then could not be sure that the Revenue Service
as part
would not recast this "stripping" dividend
4
of the proceeds of the sale of shares.
Offshore Investment Funds. The third Belle
of the 1962 Ball, the taxation of foreign investment companies under Section 1246, was left a
wallflower in the wake of the 1986 changes. The
central mechanism of Section 1246 is the same as
that of Section 1248: denial of the capital gains
preference to sellers of shares of foreign entities.
With the leveling of the capital gains preference
in the 1986 Act, Section 1246 lost most of its bite.
Meanwhile, the 1986 Act introduced far stronger
provisions on offshore passive investment in the
form of a new tax regime imposed on "passive
foreign investment companies," which is discussed below. Like many superannuated tax provisions, however, Section 1246 did not die in 1986,
but faded into a twilight of semi-relevance. It
still haunts the Code, and hence these pages.
Under Section 1246, gain from the sale of
shares of a "foreign investment company" is
taxed as ordinary income to the extent attributable
to the company's post- 1962 earnings. The point
of Section 1246 was to prevent an offshore mutual
fund from converting ordinary investment income
into capital gains. Even with Section 1246, however, the possibility of deferral remained, since
the income accumulated by an investment entity
in a tax-sheltered environment attracted U. S.
tax only upon distribution or sale of shares.
In addition, Section 1246 reaches only foreign
investment companies in which U. S. persons hold
more than 50 percent ownership. The reasons for
the adoption of a threshold of control by U. S.
persons are elusive. Investment companies are
rarely controlled by individual shareholders in
any event. The practical effect of the control requirement was that U. S. investors could join
with foreign investors to achieve a tax result that
they could not achieve on their own. To the extent other high-tax foreign jurisdictions had
similar rules, one could imagine the degree of
international cooperation that tended to result.
Investors in St. Louis with a taste for foreign
assets were more likely to seek their fellows in
Stockholm than in Minneapolis.
4See, e. g., Waterman Steamship v. United States, (CA-5

1970) (purported dividend preceding sale of shares by a
corporation held part of the purchase price).
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The Relation Between Deferral
and Control
There is a longstanding relation in the U. S.
tax system, evident in all the provisions canvassed thus far, between the current taxation of
foreign corporations and the exercise of control
by U. S. persons. This remains so, although to
a lesser degree, under present law. It is worth
considering why this is so and whether it should
be, especially since the importance of control as
a threshold of taxation has begun to erode.
The association of current taxation with control in U. S. tax law is closely linked to the notion
of realization, an underpinning of income taxation
extolled in Eisner v. Macomber and virtually unchallenged ever since.5 An investor who cannot
force a distribution of earnings is viewed as not
having "realized" income to a degree that warrants
taxation. There is an apparently deep-rooted
sense of the "unfairness" of taxing someone on
amounts that have not been reduced to a liquid
form of possession and control. Certainly some
such attitude has manifested itself in every income
tax course I have ever taught through the earnest
assertion of students that "of course" one "cannot" tax pure accretions to wealth in the hands
of people who may not have the immediate
wherewithall to pay the tax. Owners of unrealized
gains, I am sure, gain much solace at the longstanding readiness of legislators to accept this
and similar propositions without question, just
as Voltaire rejoiced that his tailor believed in
Hell (and was hence less likely to steal from him).
This respectful view of realization is vulnerable to close scrutiny, however. The owner of
unrealized gains called upon to pay a tax can borrow the necessary funds, or at a minimum (conceding that access to credit is far from universal)
borrow them from the Treasury. What I mean
by this is that the actual payment of a tax imposed on unrealized gains can be deferred until
realization, with interest determined from the
time of accrual. Under such a system there
would be no actual payment of tax before realization, but the amount of tax would not be tied to
the time of realization. Realization would simply
be the occasion of payment, but not of reckoning
the tax. For these reasons, only the payment of
tax need be deferred until gain is realized to
alleviate possible hardships of nonliquidity.
The case, if any, for tying the actual reckoning of taxation to realization (that is, an event
of quantifiable possession and control) is not one
of fairness, but of administrative convenience and
difficulty of valuation. It is no doubt difficult
across a broad range of situations to identify and
measure the actual accrual of gains. Unrealized
gains don't send their owners greeting cards as
they accrue, unless they derive from widely
traded assets that can be periodically marked to
market. Even this undeniable point, however,
hardly argues for the assumption that all gains
accrue at precisely the moment of realization.
Few assumptions indeed are less plausible.
December, 1988

It is far more realistic, in the absence of
better evidence, to deem gains from long-held
assets to have accrued ratably over their owner's
holding period. When ultimately realized, the
gains would then be taxed with an interest factor
to reflect this plausible assumption. Under such a
regime, it would seem entirely reasonable to give
the owners of investment assets the option to be
taxed on the actual accrual of gains, if those can
be demonstrated.
What I have just described, which may
sound like science fiction or the fantasies of a tax
professor gone mad, is, more or less, the income
tax regime imposed in the 1986 Act on foreign
passive investment companies, a method noteworthy in its departures from prior norms of
U. S. taxation. Considering how radical it is, the
new system of taxation of passive foreign investment companies has attracted surprisingly little
attention, none favorable. Essentially, the new
regime eliminates deferral, without regard for
control or realization, for all foreign investments
of U. S. persons in assets producing passive income. It also introduces a pattern of taxation
that could rather easily be generalized to all U. S.
interests in foreign corporations and spell the end
of deferral altogether.

Passive Foreign Investment
Companies
Introduction. The 1986 Act brought a new
tax regime for "passive foreign investment companies" (or PFICs, in the acronymic patois of
tax folk). Unlike the taxation of foreign personal
holding companies or foreign investment companies under pre-1987 law, the taxation of PFICs
does not depend on any threshold of ownership
or control by U. S. persons. Even the most
atomized holdings in PFICs give rise to current
taxation (or the equivalent) for U. S. persons
who hold their shares. Readers by now familiar
with the inexorable course of development of the
U. S. tax laws need hardly be told that the provisions governing PFICs bring a new order of
complexity to the realm previously occupied only
by foreign personal holding companies and
foreign investment companies subject to Section
1246.
The taxation of PFICs is built around the
idea of denying to U. S. persons (and hence
capturing for the U. S. Treasury) the value of
deferral of U. S. taxation on all passive investments channeled through foreign entities. The
rules achieve this end either in the obvious way
-current taxation of U. S. investors in PFICsor in the more oblique way of imposing an interest charge on the deferred distributions and gains
of those investors.
The central elements in the taxation of PFICs
are (1) the definition of a PFIC, and (2) the tax
5There is a minor exception to the realization requirement in the treatment of certain futures contracts
that are annually "marked to market" under Section 1256
of the Code.
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regime imposed on U. S. owners of shares. The
most notable feature of the former is that any
foreign entity holding passive investments may
be a PFIC, regardless of the extent of U. S.
ownership or control. The unique feature of the
latter is the interest charge (equivalent to the
value of deferred U. S. taxes) imposed on
the realized gains of U. S. shareholders unless they
elect current taxation of their share of the PFIC
earnings.
Passive Foreign Investment Company Defined. A "passive foreign investment company"
(PFIC) is any foreign corporation if "(1) 75 percent or more of the gross income of such corporation for the taxable year is passive income, or
(2) the average percentage of assets (by value)
held by such corporation during the taxable year
which produce passive income or which are held
for the production of passive income is at least
50 percent." 6 A PFIC is thus an entity that
receives mainly investment income or holds
mainly investment assets. "Passive income" is sweepingly defined to include dividends, interest, certain rents and royalties, annuities, gains from the
sale of financial assets, commodities gains, and
gains from currency translation, unless derived
from an active banking or insurance business.'
Taxation of U. S. Shareholders of PFICs.
Once a foreign corporation crosses the threshold
of being a PFIC, its U. S. shareholders are subject to a special (indeed unique) income tax
regime. The elements of this regime turn first
on whether the PFIC has elected to be taxed as
a "qualified electing fund." The baseline system
of taxation of nonelecting PFICs (codified in
Section 1291) undercuts both deferral and the
realization requirement engrained in U. S. tax law.
U. S. shareholders of nonelecting PFICs
are subject to U. S. tax on their realized gains
(dividends, other distributions, sales of shares,
liquidations, etc.), but with -an important twist.
A U. S. person who receives an "excess distribution in respect of stock" of a PFIC is required
to compute taxable income in a special way. It
is not simple, so you will want either to move
slowly through the following paragraphs or perhaps to skip them altogether and take my conclusions on faith.
First, we determine when there is an "excess
distribution." Despite the term, an excess distribution can result either from an actual distribution or from a sale of shares or a liquidation
of a PFIC, in which event the excess distributiorn includes the gain recognized by the selling
shareholder. An excess distribution is "the excess . . . of . . . the amount of the distributions . . . received by the taxpayer . . . during
the taxable year . . . over 125 percent of the

average amount received in respect of such stock
by the taxpayer during the 3 preceding taxable
years (or, if shorter, the portion of the taxpayer's holding period before the taxable year) ."8
Upon a disposition of shares, the entire gain is
treated as an excess distributiom
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In somewhat rough fashion, excess distributions are a measure of the relative rates at which
PFICs receive earnings and distribute them, or,
somewhat more obliquely, the extent of deferral
of U. S. taxation that results from the exclusion
of foreign earnings from the currently taxable
income of U. S. shareholders. To illustrate, suppose a PFIC with a sole U. S. shareholder makes
no distributions for 10 years, then distributes
$1,000 to the shareholder. One hundred and
twenty-five percent of the average amount received in the preceding three years (0) is zero.
The full $1,000 is thus an excess distribution.
Suppose instead the PFIC has distributed $100
per year. Now the excess distribution is $875.
Suppose finally that the PFIC has distributed
$1,000 per year. There is no excess distribution.
If the U. S. shareholder sells the shares of the
PFIC at a gain of $1,000, there is an excess distribution of $1,000, regardless of the distributions made in prior years.
Taxation of Excess Distributions from
PFICs. An excess distribution received by a
U. S. shareholder from a PFIC (and properly
identified under the rules just canvassed) is then
allocated to the shareholder's holding period of
the PFIC stock and taxed under the regime of
Section 1291. Under Section 1291(a) (1) (A), the
excess distribution is allocated "ratably" to each
day in the taxpayer's holding period. The U. S.
shareholder's gross income for the current year
includes, as ordinary income, the amount of the
excess distribution allocated to the current year
and to the part of the holding period before the
company was a PFIC. This inclusion accounts
for only part of the excess distribution, and does
so in a perfectly conventional way. The remainder of the excess distribution-and this the new
part-gives rise to a "deferred tax amount."
The deferred tax amount is added as a direct
increase to the taxpayer's U. S. income tax for
the current year. More or less as its name
suggests, the deferred tax amount is the sum of
a notional amount of tax attributable to the
excess distribution and an interest factor.
Specifically, the deferred tax amount is the
sum of an "aggregate increase in taxes" and an
"aggregate amount of interest" thereupon.
The
former is determined by multiplying the amounts
of excess distributions attributable to taxable
years not reached by Section 1291(a) (1) (B) by
the highest individual or corporate income tax
rate applicable in that year. The latter is determined for each of the annual components of the
''aggregate increase in taxes" by applying
the
statutory interest rate for tax obligations under
Section 6621 to each component for the period
from the filing date of the year of the component
to the filing date of the year of the excess distribution. The tax on notional prior distributions is thus determined at the highest marginal
6 IRC Sec. 1296(a).

7 IRC Sec. 1296(b).

8 IRC Sec. 1291(b) (2).
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rates in the Code (themselves not enormously
fearsome since the flattening of all rates in the
1986 Act), plus interest to make up for deferral.
This article does not aim at an exhaustive
description of the mechanics of PFIC taxation,
and the reader might well find the above slightly
too compressed for comfort. The upshot, though,
is that gains of U. S. shareholders of PFICs are
taxed at levels that tend to eliminate the advantage of deferral.
Deferral and Realization in the PFIC System. A notable feature of this tax regime is that
it may, in fact, more than compensate for deferral.
Full current taxation of the earnings of PFICs
under standard U. S. tax concepts would still
reach only their realized gains. The system of
Section 1291 reaches the unrealized gains of
PFICs to the extent they are reflected in distributions or captured by shareholders through
dispositions of shares. Increases in the value of
the assets of PFICs are allocated ratably to the
entire holding period of the shares even if realization of the gains by the PFIC itself came later
(or not at all). Thus the sale of shares of a PFIC
holding only appreciated securities triggers a tax
cost imputed to the entire holding period, while
a direct sale of the securities by the U. S. shareholders would result in a tax cost measured only
by realized gains in the year of sale. These and
similar possibilities reveal that the taxation of
PFICs under Section 1291 has the unique feature
of being potentially more severe even than full
current taxation of the income of foreign corporations. It can also be less severe, when for
example the gains of a PFIC are realized early
in the holding period of a U. S. shareholder but
are attributed ratably to the entire period in
determining the deferred tax amount under Section 1291.
Although the PFIC system of taxation largely
blunts the realization requirement, it is not strictly
the same as the elimination of realization altogether. Section 1291 does not reach gains as
they actually accrue, but treats them as arising
evenly over a holding period. Literally, it ignores
the moment of accrual of gains. Those who recoil
in horror at the thought of taxes imposed before any liquid proceeds of a transaction are
received by a taxpayer will note that no actual
payments of U. S. tax need ever be made by
U. S. shareholders of a PFIC until they have
received actual amounts from their shares.
Another novel aspect of the taxation of
PFICs is that the tax imposed on shareholders
under Section 1291 is not tied to the earnings
and profits of the entity. The tax base of the
U. S. shareholders is simply the total amount of
distributions or gains upon sale. Distributions
attributable to capital or unrealized appreciation
of assets are nonetheless subject to tax in the
shareholders' hands. This is the first instance
in the Code so far as I know of a tax regime for
corporate distributions that operates without any
regard for the earnings of the distributing entity.
December, 1988

Just such a system-indeed the elimination of the
entire concept of "earnings and profits"-has been
urged in academic circles, however.9
A final safeguard of the tax imposed by
Section 1291 is the carryover of the basis of
shares in a PFIC after the death of a shareholder.
Shares of a PFIC either retain their basis (or
take a fair market basis if it is lower) upon the
shareholder's death, unless the shareholder was
at all times during the holding period of the
PFIC stock a nonresident alien individual. A
similar rule of carryover basis at death applies
to foreign personal holding companies and foreign
investment companies subject to Section 1246,
but does not apply to controlled foreign corporations generally.

Transfers of Intangible Property
to Foreign Corporations
Movements of Assets to Foreign Corporations. Together, Subpart F and Section 1248
create a separate tax regime for controlled foreign
corporations and their U. S. shareholders; the
rules governing the taxation of foreign passive
investment companies have a similar effect. As
a result, one can discern four distinct corporate
income tax environments. There is the domestic
corporate environment, with straightforward current taxation of worldwide income. There is the
controlled foreign corporation environment-a
mix of current taxation and deferral, with eventual taxation of foreign earnings as ordinary income. There is the PFIC environment, which
spells current taxation of passive investment
income or the equivalent, backed up by deferred
interest charges. And there is the wholly foreign
(or noncontrolled foreign corporation) environment. generally with full deferral and capital
gains taxation at the end. In shorthand, these
different tax environments can be described as
domestic corporate solution, controlled foreign
corporate solution, PFIC solution, and wholly
foreign corporate solution respectively.
Section 367. These environments are not
airtight. Assets constantly move between them.
Foreign corporations receive capital from domestic corporations, distribute dividends back,
,and so on. In the wholly domestic setting, the
Code contains an extensive set of rules governing the movement of assets into, out of, and
within corporate solution, codified as Subchapter C. There is a set of adaptations of these rules
to patterns involving foreign corporations in
Section 367, which modifies the nonrecognition
rules of Subchapter C in the international tax
environment. Section 367 holds a particular
prism to the corporate tax rules to make them
mesh with the tax regime imposed on controlled
foreign corporations and other foreign corporations without loss of revenue to the U. S. Treasury.
9 See Blum, "The Earnings and Profits Limitation

on Dividend Income: A Reappraisal," 53 TAXEs-The
Tax Magazine 68 (1975).
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Sections 367(d) and 482-Notional Contingent Payments. Section 367(d) (introduced in
1984 and modified in 1986) created an entirely
new income tax regime for transfers by U. S.
persons of intangible property to foreign corporations. Rather than require recognition of gain
upon transfer, Section 367(d) treats intangible
property transferred to a foreign corporation as
giving rise to a stream of payments over its
useful life. The U. S. transferor of intangible
property is treated as having sold the property
to the foreign corporation in exchange for a
series of payments contingent upon the productivity, use, or disposition of the property.
The transferor is then taxed over the life of the
property as though a stream of contingent payments which "reasonably reflect" the property's
value in use had actually been received in exchange for the transfer.
A further qualification of Section 367(d),
added in 1986, is that the amount taken into
income by the transferor during the life of the
transferred property must "be commensurate
with the income attributable to the intangible
[property]." In effect, the actual income stream
produced by the property transferred (however
it may be determined) is imputed to the transferor under Section 367(d) during the life of the
property.
On its face, Section 367(d) applies only to
transfers of property that would otherwise be
entitled to nonrecognition of gain (at least partially) under Sections 351 or 361. And until the
1986 Act, this was indeed the whole story.
Under the 1984 Act, a notional contingent sale
was deemed to arise under Section 367(d) only
upon transfers meeting the threshold requirement for nonrecognition under Subchapter C. A
simple end run around this regime was available
to transfers that failed the requirements for
nonrecognition'.
While the 1986 Act did not change the apparent terms of Section 367(d), a modification of
Section 482 further changed the stakes in this
realm. Section 482 (which deals generally with
the allocation of income and deductions from
transactions between related taxpayers) now
contains the following final sentence: "In the case
of any transfer (or license) of intangible property . . . the income with respect to such
transfer or license shall be commensurate with
the income attributable to the intangible." One
can still escape the clasp of Section 367(d) by
engineering a recognition transaction, but that
escape does one no good, because one is thrown
thereby into the embrace of Section 482.
Broader Implications of Sections 367(d) and
482. Section 367(d) spells a substantial erosion
of the deferral of U. S. taxation on the earnings
of foreign corporations. Under Section 367(d)
a portion of overseas income, even resulting
from an active business, is forcibly brought
within the reach of U. S. taxation to the extent
it is attributable to intangible property originat1070

ing in the United States. With the additional
effect of the 1986 change in Section 482, virtually
all income attributable to intangible property
created in the United States is now subject to
current U. S. taxation, without regard for the
structure used to produce the income.
As an erosion of deferral, this result is the
more remarkable -as it reaches both active business income otherwise unaffected by subpart F
and income received by uncontrolled foreign corporations. Transfers subject to Section 367(d)
therefore include far more than transfers to controlled foreign corporations. When the post-1986
treatment of passive foreign investment companies is considered as well, it is apparent that
the sphere of deferral of U. S. taxation of foreign income earned through foreign entities is
now markedly more confined.

Concluding Perspective
Taking a step back from this accumulation
of provisions, it is apparent that the domain of
deferral as a baseline tax regime for foreign operations of U. S. persons is much reduced compared
to what it was only five years ago. Almost all
foreign passive investment is now subject to current U. S. taxation. So is a broad range of foreign
financial operations, when they are either controlled or owned by U. S. persons. To be sure, an
important core of deferral survives. Active manufacturing or marketing operations can still be
carried out overseas by U. S. enterprises without
current U. S. taxation. Firms like IBM and Ford
can still conduct much of their foreign business
beyond the immediate reach of the U. S. Treasury,
although theirs are precisely the kind of overseas
operations most likely to encounter moderate or
even high levels of foreign taxation. And even
for active overseas businesses, full deferral in the
future will be preserved only for operations that
involve no intellectual property originating in the
United States.
What this means more concretely is that the
offshore tax paradise is harder to reach. Some
aspects of the new regime can perhaps be made
concrete with an example drawn from a realm
where people have frequently sought-and found
-tax advantage in the past. If you set out tomorrow to make and distribute a motion picture outside the United States, you can no longer simply
transfer the underlying intellectual property to a
foreign corporation at low tax cost. You must
transfer cash and acquire the intellectual property
from an unrelated person or create it from scratch
abroad. In the good old days (only three years
ago), your foreign corporation did not also have
to distribute the movie as a condition of preserving deferral. It could be sold shortly after it was
made. Now there must be active distribution before any sale, unless the picture constitutes inventory in the hands of the foreign entity that
produced it, which means that the entity must
produce many pictures overseas and sell them.
And a footfault will cost you more. If you are
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overzealous in promoting the picture overseas
through your own domestic efforts, you may expose the gains of your foreign entity to a whole
new level of tax, the U. S. branch profits tax,
along with the baseline U. S. corporate income
tax, and ultimately a third level of U. S. tax on your
dividends. Deferral is not categorically beyond
reach, but there have never been as many shoals
along the way.
One can plausibly ask if the game is still
worth the candle. It would be hard to imagine a
system more Byzantine than the present multitiered complex, wherein it is necessary (1) to
keep track of almost all the earnings of foreign
corporations owned to a significant extent by
Americans in order (a) to distribute them between categories that have and have not been
subject to U. S. taxation and (b) match them with
relevant foreign income taxes, and (2) to follow
the movement of assets among several different
income tax environments.
As tax planners, to be sure, we might have a
stake in the survival of this Ptolomaic regime.
But suppose that we had resolved nonetheless to
bring all foreign income beneficially owned by
U. S. persons within the reach of current U. S.
taxation. How might we do it? The preceding
pages actually provide a road map, or perhaps
more precisely a practice run, in the system of
taxation of passive foreign investment companies.
Some variant of the PFIC system could be extended to all foreign corporations in which U. S.
persons own shares.
The PFIC system largely pacifies one objection commonly raised against the elimination of
deferral, to wit that the transactional difficulty of
measuring U. S. stockholders' shares of the current income of foreign entities, especially if they
have relatively small and dispersed ownership,
would be prohibitive. The PFIC system of taxa-
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tion provides a near equivalent of current taxation
without the burden of measuring the earnings of
foreign corporations that do not expressly accept
it. Placing all foreign corporations and their U. S.
shareholders under the PFIC regime would unquestionably end deferral and also, I believe,
reduce the overall transactional complexity of
U. S. taxation of foreign income. I must admit
that I have indulged the suspicion that the
framers of the PFIC provisions conceived them as
nose, if you prefer) of
the vanguard (or camel's
10
the end of deferral.
But why stop there? Some version of the
PFIC regime could serve to blunt the realization
requirement across the entire range of equity
interests in corporations, both foreign and domestic. With some modification it could even be
used to bring about the integration of corporate
and individual taxation. That is, if shareholders
of corporations were put to a choice of current
taxation on the earnings of corporations or ultimate taxation of their gains from shares with an
interest factor, the corporate-level income tax
could itself simply be abolished. The possibilities
are dizzying. And I should add in closing that
while such a rationalization of the tax system
might well in the very longest run simplify the
landscape enough to reduce the work of our remote successors in the tax bar, in the career of
a single tax lawyer the long run never comes. The
work of getting from here to there would keep us
busy for our lifetimes. Our children, perhaps,
would become artists. 0
10 A similar small erosion of the possibility. of deferral was recently introduced in the domestic income tax
environment as well. Under the 1987 and 1988 Acts, deferral gains derived fromi certain large installment sales
are subject to an interest charge designed to offset the
value of the deferral of taxation under the installment
method of reporting.
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